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1. The mental-file framework 
 
An increasing number of philosophers use the mental file metaphor to illuminate singular 
thinking. Different people elaborate the metaphor differently, however. 
On my own picture (Recanati 1993, 2006, 2010a, 2011, forthcoming), mental files are 
based on certain relations to objects in the environment ; different types of file correspond to 
different types of relation. The relations in question —  acquaintance relations — are 
epistemically rewarding in that they enable the subject to gain information from the object.1 
The role of the files is to store information about the objects we are acquainted with — 
information which our being acquainted with them makes available. So mental files are ‗about 
objects‘ : like singular terms in the language, they refer, or are supposed to refer. What they 
refer to is not determined by properties which the subject takes the referent to have (i.e. by 
information — or misinformation — in the file), but through relations (of the subject, or of 
the file itself construed as a mental particular) to various entities in the environment in which 
the file fulfills its function. The file corresponds to an information channel, and the reference 
is the object from which the information derives, whether that information is genuine 
information or misinformation. 
By deploying the file (or its ‗address‘ or ‗label‘) in thought, the subject can think about 
the object in virtue of standing in the relevant relation to it. What about singular terms in 
language ? They occur in sentences, and sentences express (and elicit) thoughts. From the 
                                                 
1 The paradigm is, of course, perceptual acquaintance, but the notion of acquaintance can be 
generalized ―in virtue of the analogy between relations of perceptual acquaintance and other, 
more tenuous, relations of epistemic rapport ― (Lewis 1999 : 380-81). The generalized notion 
of acquaintance covers community-mediated testimonial relations to objects mentioned to us 
in conversation, etc. 
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interpreter‘s point of view, to understand a sentence is to entertain a thought. If the sentence 
contains a singular term referring to an object a, thinking the relevant thought involves 
deploying a file also referring to a. The file in question is a constituent of the thought, namely 
what the singular term contributes to it. In other words : the file is the sense of the singular 
term. 
In Frege‘s framework, singular terms have, in addition to their referent, a sense in 
virtue of which they present the referent in a certain way. Senses obey what Schiffer calls 
‗Frege‘s constraint‘ (Schiffer 1978 : 180): if a rational subject can think of some object a both 
that it is F and that it is not F, that means that there are two distinct modes of presentation 
under which the subject thinks of a. Sense is the level at which the subject‘s rationality can be 
assessed, and this entails that senses are transparent to the thinker (Dummett 1978 : 131, 
Boghossian 1994).2  
Frege also used senses to account for non trivial identity statements such as ‗Cicero is 
Tully‘. The statement is informative because the two terms flanking the identity signs have 
different senses. But what are the senses in question ? As Fine puts it, 
 
The main problem with the Fregean position (…) is to say, in particular cases, what 
the difference in the meaning or sense of the names might plausibly be taken to be. 
Although there appear to be good theoretical reasons for thinking that there must be a 
difference, it seems hard to say in particular cases what it is. For as Kripke (1980) has 
pointed out, it seems possible for a speaker, or for speakers, to associate the same 
beliefs or information with two names, such as ―Cicero‖ and ―Tully.‖ And if the 
information or beliefs are the same, then how can the sense be different? (Fine 2007 : 
35) 
 
To address this problem, we must realize that there are two options for modes of presentation. 
They may be descriptive, in which case the object is thought of as the possessor of a certain 
identifying property. (This is Frege‘s own construal of senses.) But there are also 
nondescriptive senses or modes of presentation (Evans 1982), and these, I claim, are mental 
files. Even though files contain information (or misinformation), what plays the role of sense 
is not the information in the file, but the file itself.3 If there are two distinct files, one 
                                                 
2 This is in contrast to referents, which always present themselves under ‗guises‘ and give rise 
to all sorts of confusion (two objects mistaken for one, or one for two). 
3 In Reference and the Rational Mind, Taylor repeatedly criticizes the authors like myself who 
take mental files to be concepts, on the grounds that this conflates concepts and conceptions 
(Taylor 2003 : 75-82, 181-84 ; see Woodfield 1991 for a similar worry). Indeed, as defined by 
Taylor, conceptions seem to be nothing but mental files : ‗A conception… is a kind of mental 
particular, a labeled, perhaps highly structured, and updateable database of information about 
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associated with ‗Cicero‘ and the other with ‗Tully‘, then there are two distinct senses, even if 
the information in the two files is the same (‗a Roman orator‘). On this view, to say that the 
two terms flanking the identity sign have different senses is to say that they are associated 
with two distinct files. When an identity is discovered, the files get linked, so that information 
can flow freely between them. The files may eventually get merged, after some time. Merging 
is a complex process : an ‗inclusive file‘ is created, into which all (consistent) information 
from the inital files is transferred ; then the initial files are deleted. But the initial files need 
not be deleted. In partial merging, the initial files are retained after an inclusive file has been 
created. (See example (4) below for an instance of partial merging.)4 
Two terms that are associated with the same file have the same sense, and this allows a 
rational subject to ‗trade upon identity‘ (Campbell 1987, 1994, 2002). Thus from the two-
sentence discourse 
 
(1) John met Ciceroi the other day. The bastardi walked away. 
 
we can infer ‗there is an x such that John met x the other day and x walked away‘, simply 
because the two terms ‗Cicero‘ and ‗the bastard‘ are associated with the same file (as the 
subscripts indicate). Two terms that are associated with the same file are coreferential de 
jure : ‗anyone who raises the question of whether the[ir] reference [i]s the same would 
thereby betray his lack of understanding‘ (Fine 2007 : 40). In contrast, one may fully 
understand the identity statement ‗Cicero is Tully‘, and still wonder whether it is true (i.e. 
whether the two terms ‗Cicero‘ and ‗Tully‘ are actually coreferential). Full understanding 
requires grasping the sense of the terms and realizing that the two terms are associated with 
the same file if they are. (In the case of ‗Cicero‘ and ‗Tully‘, the  senses are different and the 
two terms are only de facto coreferential.) 
                                                                                                                                                        
the extension of an associated concept. For example, each thinker who can deploy the concept 
<cat> in thought episodes is likely to have stored in his head a database of information (and 
misinformation) about cats‘ (Taylor 2003 : 181). Taylor‘s main objection to equating 
concepts and conceptions is that this entails that ‗what concepts a cognizer has supervenes, 
more or less, on what beliefs the thinker has‘ (Taylor 2003 : 77). But I deny that this 
unwelcome consequence holds if concepts are equated to mental files. The problem with 
Taylor‘s notion of a ‗conception‘ is that, even though he describes a conception as a mental 
particular, it seems to correspond to the content of a mental file (at a time) rather than to the 
file itself. I draw a sharp distinction between the two things — the file itself, and its content. 
4 The phenomenon of partial merging is important because it provides a way out of a 
difficulty raised by Pinillos for mental file accounts of identity statements. See footnote 10 
below, and the references therein. 
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2. Beyond acquaintance 
 
Mental files, I said, are characterized by their function : to store information gained in virtue 
of acquaintance relations to the reference of the file. If this is right, and if, as I also said, 
singular thinking proceeds through the deployment of a mental file, then acquaintance is 
involved in the very concept of a singular thought. But this does not mean that one can think a 
singular thought only if one is acquainted with the referent. That singular thinking involves 
mental files, whose role is to store information gained through acquaintance relations to the 
reference, is compatible with the view that one can think a singular thought in the absence of 
acquaintance. 
What, then, are the necessary conditions for thinking a singular thought ? To answer 
that question, we need to draw a crucial distinction (familiar in the neo-Fregean literature) 
between thought-vehicle and thought-content, and a corresponding distinction between the 
conditions necessary for tokening a singular thought-vehicle and the conditions necessary for 
successfully thinking a singular thought-content. 
 To think a singular thought in the sense of vehicle, one must activate a mental file. The 
role of a mental file is to store information gained through acquaintance with the referent, but 
such files can be opened in the absence of acquaintance. The most typical reason for so doing 
(in the absence of actual acquaintance) is that we expect that future acquaintance with the 
referent will enable us to gain information from it, information which will go into the file. 
Thus the name ‗Jack the Ripper‘ was introduced to refer to whoever committed certain 
murders, and ‗Neptune‘ was introduced to refer to whatever planet causes certain 
perturbations in the orbit of Uranus. Even though the referent of such ‗descriptive names‘ is 
known only by description, the subject nevertheless opens a file for it because he anticipates 
that he will soon be acquainted with it and needs a place to store information about it 
(Recanati 1993 : 180).  
In the absence of actual acquaintance, is expected acquaintance necessary to open a 
mental file ? I do not think so. Imagined acquaintance, just as expected acquaintance, justifies 
opening a file and tokening a singular term in thought.5 Moreover, one may open a mental file 
to do other things than what it is the normal function of mental files to do — things that have 
nothing to do with acquaintance (Jeshion 2010). For example, thinking about the average 
                                                 
5 Jeshion gives the example of ‗a child‘s imaginary friend‘ (Jeshion 2010 : 136). 
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mid-twentieth century American, I may give him a name and predicate things of him.6 When 
one uses a name in such a way, there is no doubt that the name has a function, distinct from 
(though parasitic on) the normal function of names. So I think one should definitely be 
‗liberal‘ with regard to the generation of mental files.7 The natural and primary function of 
mental files is to store information, so the typical reason for opening a mental file is that one 
expects to get information, but even if one has no such expectation, one may have other 
reasons for thinking through a singular vehicle. 
Besides the conditions on the generation of mental files, however, we must follow 
Evans in also making room also for conditions on their success. Opening a mental file is 
sufficient to entertain a singular thought only in the sense of thought-vehicle. It is not 
sufficient to entertain a singular thought in the sense of thought-content. Why is that so ? 
Because the content we‘re talking about is truth-conditional content. A ‗successful‘ singular 
thought is a thought that has singular truth-conditions, that is, a thought such that there is an x 
such that the thought is true (with respect to an arbitrary possible world) iff…x… The 
singular content of such a thought is object-dependent : there is no such content if there is no 
object to which the speaker refers by deploying the relevant mental file. This makes all the 
difference between the case of Neptune and the case of Vulcan. In both cases Leverrier, 
anticipating the discovery of the planet whose existence he (seemingly) had been able to infer, 
opened a mental file and created a file ; but Leverrier‘s expectation was correct in the first 
case, incorrect in the second. So a singular term was tokened when Leverrier thought ‗The 
discovery of Vulcan will make me famous‘, but no singular thought content was thereby 
entertained, because there is no object x such that Leverrier‘s thought is true just in case that 
object has the relevant property. 
There are all sorts of debates on what exactly the conditions are for thinking singular 
contents. In Recanati (2010a) I argued that to think a singular thought content one must at 
least expect acquaintance with the putative referent and be right in one‘s expectation. For my 
present purposes, however, the only thing that matters is that tokening a singular vehicle is 
not sufficient for thinking a singular thought content : some further conditions have to be met, 
which include the existence of an object to which, at some time or other, the thinker is 
                                                 
6 This is related to the phenomenon of ‗arbitrary reference‘ discussed in Breckenridge and 
Magidor (2011). 
7 ‗Liberalism‘ is characterized by Hawthorne and Manley (forthcoming) as the view that there 
is no acquaintance constraint on singular thought. 
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suitably related in an epistemically rewarding manner. So Leverrier‘s thought about Vulcan is 
the paradigm case of an unsuccessful tokening of a singular vehicle.  
Familiar though it is, the view I have just expounded raises a major difficulty. It 
entails that Leverrier failed to express a singular content when he said or thought ‗the 
discovery of Vulcan will make me famous‘, the reason for this being that ‗Vulcan‘ is an 
empty singular term. But there are well-known cases in which tokening an empty singular 
term does not prevent one from expressing a truth-evaluable content. Thus if I say or think 
 
(2) Leverrier thought that the discovery of Vulcan would make him famous 
 
I say something true (assuming Leverrier actually thought ‗the discovery of Vulcan will make 
me famous‘) : I successfully use the empty name in order to ascribe to  Leverrier what I called 
a ‗pseudo-singular belief‘ (Recanati 1998 : 557, 2000 : 226).8 How can that be ? The problem 
is related to the problem of ‗negative existentials‘ like 
 
(3) Vulcan does not exist 
 
Such a statement also says something true, even though an empty singular term is tokened. 
What is the function of empty names in such contexts ? How, in the mental-file framework, 
can we account for such cases ? 
To answer these questions, we need to appeal to the idea of a derived function for 
mental files (Recanati 2010a : 177-81). Mental files are primarily singular terms in the 
language of thought : they serve to think about objects in the world. But, I claim, they have a 
derived, metarepresentational function : they (also) serve to represent how other subjects 
think about objects in the world. This additional, metarepresentational function of files 
accounts for all the ‗intentional‘ uses of empty singular terms, illustrated by (inter alia) 
negative existentials and pseudo-singular attitude ascriptions. Or so I want to argue. 
 
                                                 
8 To entertain a pseudo-singular belief  is to have a singular mental sentence tokened in one‘s 
belief box, but one that fails to express any proposition. If I say or think ‗My son believes that 
Santa Claus will come tonight‘, it seems that I successfully use the empty name ‗Santa Claus‘ 
to ascribe to my son a pseudo-singular belief. 
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3. Indexed files 
 
To account for the metarepresentational use of files, we need the notion of an indexed file. An 
indexed file is a file that stands, in the subject‘s mind, for another subject‘s file about an 
object. An indexed file consists of a file and an index, where the index refers to the other 
subject whose own file the indexed file stands for or simulates. Thus an indexed file <f, S2> in 
S1‘s mind stands for the file f which S2 putatively uses in thinking about some entity. So there 
are two types of file in S1‘s mind : regular files which S1 uses to think about objects in his or 
her environment, and indexed files which s/he uses vicariously to represent how other 
subjects (e.g. S2) think about objects in their environment.9 
As an example, consider the following case of attitude ascription, in which the 
ascribee (the person to whom the attitude is ascribed) is the subject himself at an earlier stage 
of his doxastic development : 
 
(4) I was deliberating whether to investigate both Hesperus and Phosphorus; but when 
I got evidence of their true identity, I immediately sent probes there. 
 
In this example, which I adapt from one by Angel Pinillos (2009, 2011), three files are 
involved. The ‗Hesperus‘ and ‗Phosphorus‘ files are the files which (before learning the 
identity — when he was deliberating whether to investigate both Hesperus and Phosphorus or 
only one of them) the confused subject used to deploy in thinking about Venus. These files 
are still available after learning the identity, but their status has changed : their role is now to 
enable the subject to represent how he thought of Venus previously. Learning the identity 
caused the subject to open an inclusive file for Venus and to transfer information from the 
‗Hesperus‘ and the ‗Phosphorus‘ files into it. It is this inclusive file which, arguably, gives the 
sense of the adverb ‗there‘, at the end of the sentence.10 But instead of deleting the initial files 
and completing the second step of the merge operation, the subject has retained the initial files 
                                                 
9 Indexed files are recursive : the file component of an indexed file may itself be an indexed 
file. Thus S1 may think about S2‘s way of thinking of S3‘s way of thinking of some entity, and 
to that effect may entertain the indexed file <<f, S3>, S2>. 
10 The locative adverb, Pinillos rightly claims, is coreferential de jure with both ‗Hesperus‘ 
and ‗Phosphorus‘. Since ‗Hesperus‘ and ‗Phosphorus‘ are not de jure coreferential, Pinillos 
thinks this example raises a major difficulty for the mental file account (or any account of de 
jure coreference in terms of sameness of sense), since the account predicts that de jure 
coreference is a transitive relation. I deny that the account has this consequence, however 
(Recanati 2011, forthcoming : chapter 9). 
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(linked together, and linked also to the inclusive file), and uses them vicariously to represent 
how, when confused, he used to think of Venus. In other words, the ‗Hesperus‘ and 
‗Phosphorus‘ files, as used by the speaker in (4), are indexed to his or her earlier self, while 
the inclusive ‗Venus‘ file associated with ‗there‘ at the end of the sentence is a regular file. 
Given the existence of two types of files in the subject‘s mind (regular files and indexed 
files), and the mechanism of linking that operates between files, there are two possibilities for 
a given indexed file. Either the indexed file, which represents some other subject‘s way of 
thinking about some entity, is linked to some regular file in the subject‘s mind referring to the 
same entity (and corresponding to the subject‘s own way of thinking of that entity) ; or it 
isn‘t. If it isn‘t, the subject‘s only access to the entity in question is via the filing system of 
other subjects. For example, S1 may not believe in witches, but may still ascribe to S2 
thoughts about a certain witch which S2 thinks has blighted his mare (Geach 1967 ; Edelberg 
1992). In this case S1 does not refer to the witch in the full-blown sense of the term ; he does 
not express a genuine singular thought about the witch, but only a vicarious singular thought 
— a singular thought by proxy, as it were. This is the free-wheeling, or unloaded, use of 
indexed files, illustrated by e.g. ‗My son believes that Santa Claus is coming tonight‘. 
 The other possibility for an indexed file is to be linked to a regular file in the subject‘s 
mind. In such a case the subject has two ways of thinking of the object : a way of thinking of 
his own (a regular file) and a vicarious way of thinking (the indexed file). If the subject uses 
the indexed file to think about the object, that use is ‗loaded‘ and has existential import, in 
contrast to the free-wheeling use. Even though the subject refers to the object through some 
other subject‘s file about it, he takes that object to exist since he himself has a regular file 
about it. In this way a singular thought is genuinely expressed. Example (4) is a case in point: 
the speaker uses two vicarious files indexed to his earlier self, namely a Hesperus file and a 
Phosophorus file, both of which are linked to his current Venus file and therefore carry 
ontological commitment. 
There is an important difference between linking as it operates between regular files 
(horizontal linking), and linking as it operates between regular files and indexed files, or 
between indexed files of different degrees of embedding (vertical linking). Linking between 
regular files typically makes it possible for information to flow freely between the linked 
files. But indexed files are used to stand for some other subject‘s body of information about 
some object, and that function could not be served if, through linking, the indexed file was 
contaminated by the subject‘s own information about that object. Information can flow only 
after undergoing upward or downward conversion (for example, a predicate xGx in an 
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indexed file <f, S2> can be transferred into the subject‘s regular file to which it is vertically 
linked only after upward conversion into x S2 believes that x is G).11 So vertical linking 
between regular files and indexed files (or between indexed files with different degrees of 
embedding) preserves the informational encapsulation of files, which standard (horizontal) 
linking typically has the effect of suppressing. 
 
4. Mental files and opacity 
 
In light of the distinction between regular files and indexed files, let us consider the possible 
interpretations of an attitude report of the form ‗x believes that a is F‘. We shall restrict 
ourselves to the cases where ‗a‘ is a genuine singular term (a name or an indexical) rather 
than a definite description.12 
Classically one distinguishes between transparent and opaque interpretations of an 
attitude report. In transparent attitude ascriptions, the sense-providing file associated with the 
singular term in the embedded clause is the speaker‘s regular file — his way of thinking of 
the object about which a belief is ascribed to some other subject. The ascribee‘s own way of 
thinking is not specified at all (or so the usual story goes) : there is implicit existential 
quantification over the modes of presentation (mental files) in the ascribee‘s mind. The 
utterance only specifies the object the ascribed belief is about, not the way that object is 
thought about by the ascribee. 13 
In opaque attitude ascriptions, a (more or less specific) mode of presentation is part 
and parcel of the ascribed thought content. The mode of presentation in question is an indexed 
file that is typically ‗loaded‘, that is, linked to a regular file in the speaker‘s mind. (Cases in 
which the indexed file is unloaded will be discussed in the next section.) It follows that two 
files are potentially relevant to the interpretation of the utterance in such cases: one provides 
the speaker‘s own way of thinking of the referent, and the other the ascribee‘s way of 
thinking. In Direct Reference I distinguished these two modes of presentation by calling them 
the ‗exercised‘ mode of presentation and the ‗ascribed‘ mode of presentation respectively. 
                                                 
11 Likewise, the process of downward conversion necessary to transfer information in the 
other direction – from the regular file to the indexed file — involves putting the predicate in 
the scope of some actuality operator. 
12 As I pointed out in Direct Reference (chapter 20), there are three times more interpretations 
for such a sentence if definite descriptions are allowed as substituends for the schematic letter 
‗a‘, because with definite descriptions the relevant modes of presentation may be descriptive 
as well as nondescriptive. 
13 This will be qualified below. 
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To see how the two modes of presentation come into play, consider the following 
example of an opaque attribution of attitude. I borrow it from Daniel Morgan‘s dissertation on 
first person thinking (chapter 5). 
 
The Roll-Call Game 
A new substitute teacher comes to class. One game the class always enjoys playing 
with a new substitute teacher is the roll-call game. The only rule of the roll-call game 
is that when teacher calls out a given name, someone other than the bearer of that 
name calls back ―here‖. When teacher calls out ―Daniel‖, Mark says ―here‖. When 
teacher calls out ―Mark‖, Daniel says ―here‖. When teacher calls out ―Susie‖, Tracy 
says ―here‖. When teacher calls out ―Tracy‖, Susie says ―here‖. Unfortunately, the 
principal knows about the roll-call game and has armed the substitute teacher with a 
chart linking all the pupils‘ names and photos. I, who have found this out, tell the other 
pupils that the game is off. ―The principal gave her a chart with our names and photos, 
so she already knows who everybody is. She knows that you are Mark, that Tracy is 
Tracy, and that I am Daniel‖. (Morgan 2011 : 176-77) 
 
As Morgan rightly points out, ‗She knows that I am Daniel‘ is an opaque attitude ascription, 
because a specific visual mode of presentation of Daniel (the referent of ‗I‘) is ascribed to the 
teacher: 
 
Suppose… that the teacher hasn‘t bothered to look at her chart. Does the teacher have 
the knowledge I said she had? No, she doesn‘t. She doesn‘t have the knowledge I said 
she had even if, for example, she has also become my new neighbor, and has been told 
my name, so that she does know, of the boy she has seen next door, that he is Daniel 
(although this would be enough to make my knowledge ascription true if it were just a 
transparent ascription). The reason what I said is false is, roughly, that the teacher 
cannot recognize me in class as someone whose name she knows to be ―Daniel‖. Such 
knowledge – perhaps we might think of it as knowledge that involves deploying a 
recognitional concept – is precisely the kind of knowledge she would need to have to 
frustrate our purposes in playing the roll call game, and the point of my remark was to 
indicate (…) that those purposes had been frustrated. So the knowledge-ascription 
expressed by this first-person-pronoun involving sentence does imply something about 
how the object of the attitude is being thought about – it is not to be interpreted 
transparently. But it does not imply that that object is being thought about using the 
first-person concept. (Morgan 2011 : 177) 
 
Still, I would say, the first person concept does play a role in this example. The speaker says 
‗I‘, and this constrains the file (or one of the files) associated with the singular term : the 
relevant file is bound to contain the piece of information ‗is uttering this token‘. The file thus 
constrained is not the indexed file about Daniel which the utterance ascribes to the teacher, 
however ; for the teacher is not aware of Daniel‘s uttering this token of ‗She knows I am 
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Daniel‘. In such cases, the character of ‗I‘ does not constrain the ascribed mode of 
presentation (the indexed file), it can only constrain the exercised mode of presentation (the 
speaker‘s regular file). The speaker knows that he himself is uttering this token, and as the use 
of ‗I‘ indicates, it is his first person file which the speaker deploys in thinking about himself  
as the object the teacher‘s attitude is about. So two files are involved in the interpretation of 
that utterance : one is the regular file which the speaker exercises in thinking/speaking about 
himself (a first person file), the other is a vicarious file indexed to the teacher (a recognitional 
file). 
 Are both files relevant to the semantic content of the utterance ? I think the answer has 
to be positive, though for different reasons.14 The ascribed mode of presentation pertains to 
semantic content (in one sense of the phrase ‗semantic content‘) because it is truth-
conditionally relevant. As Morgan emphasizes, the utterance ‗She knows I am Daniel‘ is not 
true in the context of the Roll-Call Game unless the teacher is able to visually recognize the 
referent as Daniel.15 As for the exercised mode of presentation, we may take it also to be 
semantically relevant because the referring expression, in virtue of its linguistic meaning, 
constrains it. As I have argued elsewhere (Recanati 1993, 1995, forthcoming), the linguistic 
meaning of a referring expression sets up a constraint on the mental file through which the 
reference of the expression is determined : that file has to contain the piece of information 
conventionally encoded by the referring expression (the information that the referent is the 
speaker, in the case of ‗I‘ ; that the referent is the addressee, in the case of ‗you‘ ; that the 
referent is named ‗Smith‘, in the case of the proper name Smith ; that the referent is the F, in 
the case of a referential use of the description ‗the F‘…). In many cases, especially when 
indexicals are used, the constraint applies to the mode of presentation exercised by the 
speaker, rather than to the ascribed mode of presentation.16 The fact that the conventional 
                                                 
14 By saying that the answer is positive, I do not mean to endorse the presupposition that there 
is a well-defined, non-disjunctive notion of ‗semantic content‘. Actually, I think the notion is 
disjunctive (Recanati 2004). Thanks to Daniel Morgan for urging me to make this explicit. 
15 See Schiffer 1977, Crimmins and Perry 1989, Recanati 1993 for the idea that the ascribee‘s 
mode of presentation is tacitly referred to and affects truth-conditions. 
16 The reason for this is that, as I said in Direct Reference, ‗the mode of presentation 
associated with an indexical is tied to the particular context in which that indexical is used. 
Only someone in that context can think of the referent under that mode of presentation. So the 
mode of presentation associated with an indexical can hardly occur outside the thoughts of the 
speaker and his addressee, who are both in the right context ; in particular, there is no reason 
to suppose that the mode of presentation in question is also a constituent of the believer’s 
thought, since the believer is generally not one of the participants of the speech episode‘ 
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meaning of the expression constrains the speaker‘s file is enough, I think, to make the latter 
relevant to the semantic interpretation of the utterance (in one sense of ‗semantic 
interpretation‘). 
It may be doubted that there are fully transparent uses, that is, uses where nothing 
whatsoever is contextually suggested regarding the way the ascribee thinks of the object 
his or her belief is about.17 Consider another example from Pinillos, which I discuss in 
Mental Files (Chapter 9) : 
 
(5) He1 was in drags, and (as a result) Sally thought that Smith1 wasn‘t Smith. 
 
Pinillos claims, wrongly in my view, that in this example the two occurrences of the name 
‗Smith‘ are not de jure coreferential. Pinillos‘s argument is the following: 
 
If they were de jure coreferential, then it should follow that Sally thought that there is 
an x such that x is not x (an absurd belief). (Pinillos 2009) 
 
But that does not actually follow. What follows from the assumption of de jure coreference is 
that, for some x, Sally thought that x was not x, and that is not an absurd belief. This is like 
Russell‘s example : ‗I thought your ship was longer than it is‘. There are two readings : one 
reading on which the ascribed thought is irrational, and a transparent reading in which it is 
not. On the transparent reading of (5) the two occurrences of ‗Smith‘ are associated with the 
same mental file, namely the speaker’s mental file about Smith ; so they are de jure 
coreferential. The belief ascribed to Sally is not irrational, however, but merely under-
specified : the utterance says that for a certain x (namely Smith), Sally believes of x that he is 
not x. For that belief to be rational it is sufficient for Sally to deploy two distinct modes of 
presentation of x in her thought, and to think of Smith (represented under one mode of 
presentation) that he is not Smith (represented under the other mode of presentation). Even if 
Sally‘s modes of presentation are not specified in the speaker‘s utterance, their distinctness 
can be inferred from the presumption that Sally is rational.18 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Recanati 1993 : 400). In this passage, ‗the mode of presentation associated with an indexical‘ 
refers to the mode of presentation linguistically constrained by the meaning of the indexical. 
17 See Crimmins 1995 for discussion of this point. 
18 The interpretation of (apparently) trivial identity statements such as ‗Smith is Smith‘ works 
the same way. The two occurrences of ‗Smith‘ are associated with the same mental file, 
namely the speaker’s mental file about Smith; so they are de jure coreferential. At the same 
 13 
But is it true that the ascribee‘s mode of presentation is not specified in that example? 
This is far from obvious. In the context of (5) it is strongly suggested that one of the modes of 
presentation under which the ascribee thinks of Smith has something to do with his being in 
drags. Here too, therefore, we find that there are two files simultaneously in use in the 
interpretation of the grammatical subject of the embedded clause : one is the speaker‘s regular 
file about Smith, which is associated with both occurrences of the name ‗Smith‘ in the 
utterance and makes them de jure coreferential ; the other is the ascribee‘s demonstrative file 
about the man in drags (who happens to be Smith). The speaker represents Smith directly 
under his regular file ‗Smith‘, and at the same time he represents him vicariously through a 
demonstrative file indexed to the ascribee. The indexed file in question (‗that man in drags‘) 
is vertically linked to the speaker‘s regular file about Smith. So (5) is not a fully transparent 
belief ascription. It is a hybrid, like most belief ascriptions. 
 I conclude that attitude ascriptions typically involve two modes of presentation : the 
speaker‘s (a regular file) and the ascribee‘s (an indexed file). The only significant distinction 
which can be drawn between two classes of case here is the distinction between cases in 
which the linguistic meaning of the referring expression constrains the ascribee‘s file, and 
cases in which it only constrains the speaker‘s file. The latter might be called the ‗transparent‘ 
cases, but they are not really transparent in the usual sense : even if the linguistic material 
only constrains the speaker‘s file, this does not prevent the ascribee‘s file from being 
contextually recoverable to some extent,19 and to affect the truth-conditions of the report. 
Thus, in Morgan‘s example (‗She knows that I am Daniel‘), the meaning of ‗I‘ only 
constrains the speaker‘s file, but the ascription is still opaque in the sense that it is true only if 
the teacher thinks of the referent under a particular mode of presentation. 
 
5. ‘Intentional’ uses of empty singular terms 
                                                                                                                                                        
time, as Schroeter puts it, such a claim ‗is best understood as responding to a doubt about the 
identity‘ of the two Smiths (Schroeter 2007 : 614n). That means that, in addition to being 
associated with the speaker‘s file about Smith, the two occurrences of ‗Smith‘ are also 
associated with two separate vicarious files indexed to some (contextually determined) 
subject unaware of the identity. 
19 Likewise, when the linguistic meaning of the referring expression pertains to the ascribee‘s 
files rather than the speaker‘s, that does not prevent the speaker‘s file to be contextually 
recoverable. Example (4) is a case in point: it is contextually clear how the speaker currently 
thinks of the referent even though he refers to it through vicarious files indexed to his ealier 
self. The only cases in which no file is recoverable on the speaker‘s side seem to be the cases 
in which the indexed file that is used remains unloaded (free wheeling cases). 
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Intentional uses of empty singular terms correspond to a third type of case : the case in 
which the sense-providing file associated with a singular term is a free-wheeling (unloaded) 
indexed file. In attitude ascriptions that interpretation arises when the singular term in the 
embedded clause is mutually known not to refer (as in ‗Leverrier believed that the discovery 
of Vulcan would make him famous‘ or ‗My son believes that Santa Claus is coming tonight‘). 
These are the only attitude ascriptions which are fully opaque : the object the thought is about 
is only construed from the ascribee‘s point of view, but the speaker does not deploy a regular 
file about it. In such cases, the ascribed belief is ‗pseudo-singular‘ : the ascription portrays the 
ascribee as having a singular mental sentence tokened in her belief box, but one that fails to 
express any proposition. 
What about negative existentials ? It seems that the same sort of analysis applies : the 
file associated with the singular term is a free-wheeling indexed file, so using the term in this 
context carries no ontological commitment and there is no contradiction between using the 
singular term and denying existence to its referent. 
Geach‘s ‗intentional identity‘ cases fall into the same category. This is not surprising 
since they involve a pseudo-singular attitude ascription : 
 
(6) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob‘s mare, and Nob wonders whether she killed 
Cob‘s sow. 
 
The file introduced by the indefinite ‗a witch‘ in the first conjunct is a free-wheeling indexed 
file.20 The pronoun in the scope of the attitude verb in the second conjunct is anaphoric on the 
indefinite and inherits the associated file. 
 This raises a problem. The anaphoric relation between the indefinite and the pronoun 
implies that the same file is deployed by Nob and by Hob. What does that mean ? To answer 
this question we need to make room for public or shared files – files shared by distinct 
individuals in a community. This is an important issue, but orthogonal to the topic of this 
paper, so better left for another occasion. 
 
6. Conclusion 
                                                 
20 On the idea that indefinites introduce files, see Karttunen 1976 and the subsequent literature 
on dynamic semantics. 
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In conclusion, I‘d like to emphasize an important characteristics of the notion of indexed file I 
have put forward to account for intentional uses of empty singular terms. Indexed files, I take 
it, have an iconic dimension. To represent the file deployed by the person to whom a singular 
attitude is ascribed, we deploy a similar file, indexed to that person. Or perhaps we should say 
that indexed files are a simulative device : by deploying a mental file just like the file in the 
mind of the indexed person, one simulates the mental state one is attempting to describe ; one 
puts oneself in the other person‘s shoes (or frame of mind), by looking at things her way. 
One way of capturing the iconic/simulative dimension of indexed files would be to 
treat them as quotational devices. In quotation, one refers to a linguistic expression by 
actually using it or (more cautiously) displaying it. Similarly, there is a sense in which an 
indexed file stands for itself, that is, for the file in the mind of the person one is simulating by 
deploying that very file. 
The analogy with quotation is tricky, however. Standardly, quotations are opaque : the 
expression in quotes refers to itself, rather than to its ordinary referent. This, at least, is true of 
the central class of quotations which I dubbed closed quotations (Recanati 2001, 2010b : 
chapter 7). Indexed files behave differently. While indexed, the file still refers to its ordinary 
referent, that is, it still refers to the object the simulated file is about. In standard instances of 
opaque attitude attribution, a singular term in the embedded clause evokes a file in the 
ascribee‘s mind and refers to the referent of that file (not to the file itself). This is, as Quine 
would put it, a mixture of use and mention. Indexed files can still be treated as a quotational 
device, but the type of quotation at issue has to be open quotation, not closed quotation. Open 
quotations have an echoic character but, typically, the quoted words keep their ordinary 
meaning and reference while evoking or echoing the words of some other person or persons 
(Recanati 2008, 2010b : chapter 8). 
The following example (from Recanati 1987) illustrates open quotation and can easily 
be analysed in terms of indexed files : 
 
(7) Hey, ‗your sister‘ is coming over 
 
Here the description ‗your sister‘ refers to Ann, who is not the addressee‘s sister, but is 
thought to be so by James, a third party who the speaker is ironically echoing. The reference 
is the reference of the relevant file (the file which contains the information : ‗is the 
addressee‘s sister‘), and in this case the relevant file is a file in some other subject‘s mind. So 
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the file the speaker uses to refer to Ann is a file indexed to James. The indexed file is linked 
to the speaker‘s own file about Ann (or to a public file about her shared by the speaker and 
her addressee). Since that file about Ann does not contain the information ‗addressee‘s sister‘, 
it is clear that in this example the linguistic materials constrain the indexed file, rather than 
the regular file through which the speaker thinks of the referent. 
 What is interesting about (7) is that it is not globally metarepresentational. (7) is not 
about anybody‘s attitudes or representations: it ascribes to Ann the property of coming over. 
(7) does not even mention James, the person whose way of thinking is being echoed. The 
metarepresentational element that is undoubtedly present is to be found at the level of sense 
rather than the level of reference. The sense of the description is an indexed file, and an 
indexed file is a file that is tacitly ascribed to some other subject ; but the ascription of the file 
to James remains external to the utterance‘s truth-conditional content.21  
What I have said about the relative transparency of indexed files (by which I mean : 
the fact that indexing preserves reference) only applies to those indexed files that are loaded 
and ontologically commit the speaker/thinker. Unloaded indexed files are special in that their 
use is fully opaque. They do not refer to anything — the only reference there is is pretend or 
simulated reference. As a result, there are only two options for an utterance containing a 
singular term associated with a free-wheeling indexed file. 
First option : the utterance does not express a genuine thought, but only a ‗mock 
thought‘, as Frege puts it (1979 : 30). If I say to my children: ‗Santa Claus is coming tonight‘, 
I do not express a genuine singular thought. I only pretend to refer to Santa Claus, and to 
predicate something of him. (The same thing is arguably true if, echoing my children, I tell 
my wife : ‗Santa Claus is coming tonight‘. Here the file associated with ‗Santa Claus‘ is 
indexed to Santa-Claus believers and unloaded, so the whole speech act has to be seen as a 
form of pretense.) Second option : the utterance expresses a thought that is globally 
metarepresentational – it is about someone‘s, e.g. my children‘s, representations, rather than 
about what these representations are about. This corresponds to pseudo-singular belief 
ascriptions. I think negative (and positive) existentials too are meta-representational, but that 
is one of the issues I must leave for another occasion.22 
 
                                                 
21 The possible occurrence of indexed files in non-metarepresentational contexts accounts for 
substitutivity failures in simple sentences, as in Saul-type examples (Saul 1997). 
22 The research reported in this chapter has received funding from the European Community‘s 
Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007-2013 under grant agreement n° FP7-238128 and 
ERC grant agreement n° 229441–CCC. 
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